Andrés Mourenza

Question: Do you consider that Erdoğan is on his way to becoming a dictator?

 

Answer: Well, it's an interesting debate and I think not exactly. Because Turkey is a system halfway between a liberal democracy and a dictatorship. And the proof that it has not become a dictatorship is that the government can still lose at the ballot box. For example, it has not reached the level of Russia, because Russia is somewhat more authoritarian, but it stays ahead of Hungary in terms of the power of the president, so Turkey is in the middle of both. These are hybrid regimes that have been proliferating in recent years, in which power is very much concentrated in the figure of the government of the president, in this case, in which elections still exist, in which the opposition cannot win or has a very difficult time. However, on the other hand, in the possibility that there could be changes as has happened in these local elections or in the previous ones, it indicates that it is not entirely a dictatorship. So, we are there in something that is not quite a dictatorship, but it is certainly not liberal democracy. 

 

 

Q: How would you describe the current relationship between Turkey and the European Union? 

 

A: Problematic, to say the least. The original sin is probably that of the European Union. When in the late 2000s still Erdoğan was betting on further democratization of public authorities, that's when Merkel, Sarkozy and other center-right and right-wing rulers in Europe started campaigning that they didn't want a Muslim country in the EU. Obviously this cooled relations a lot, because Turkey is a very proud, very nationalistic country, and the fact that it was treated like that obviously contributed. It is also true that this coincided with the time when Erdoğan's party began to consolidate its power, so the fact of democratization was no longer profitable for him. It is more or less calculated that it was around 2007 or 2011 when the democratic, liberal and conservative AKP ended and the AKP began with an increasingly authoritarian stance and, therefore, a greater distancing from the EU. I have to say that the appointment of the new Turkish Interior Minister, who is tough on immigration, on organized crime and is more collaborative, has made Turkey and the EU get along better, because Europe is tough on immigration, for example.

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Q: What is the current state of human rights and civil liberties in Turkey?

 

A: Well, they are bad. Things got really tough after the coup d'état. Now let's say that the repression is loosening up a bit, it seems like you can breathe more, but there are indeed a lot of restrictions, both on freedom of speech and freedom of demonstration - only pro-government people or those close to them can demonstrate. 

 

 

Q: How has Turkey's economic performance been in recent years and what are the current economic challenges?

 

A: If you go back 22 years ago when the AKP came to power, it was in the middle of a very tough economic crisis. Then Erdoğan starts to run a hyper heterodox theory, probably false, which is that raising interest rates creates inflation, but the reality is that it is usually the other way around: orthodox economic ideas talk about when there is inflation you have to raise interest rates. So he started about four or five years ago, after there was a tremendous economic crisis in 2019 in which the lira sank a lot, to hire super orthodox people to cut the economic situation of the country and after six months he would throw them out and put other gentlemen at the head of the Central Bank and after six months or a year he would throw them out again, and so on and so forth. Not only that, he also continually changes the Minister of Economy, the head of the Institute of Statistics, and so on. So, Turkey is plunged into a problem of brutal inflation that has left the Central Bank with practically no reserves and, after the last elections, they have put in place an ultra-orthodox and ultra-liberal financial economic administration to regain the confidence of the market. This has meant that they are starting to implement economic austerity measures, such as no longer raising the minimum wage every six months. Right now inflation is at 70%, pensions are at rock bottom and people are starting to have a hard time, because we are with prices almost higher than in Spain with a minimum wage of 500 € and pensions of between 200 and 300 €. 

 

 

Q: Do you think the secularism of the Republic is in danger with Erdoğan the government?

 

A: The short answer is yes, because in fact there is no such secularism anymore. But unlike France, for example, here there is no Church-State separation, because, since the beginning of the Republic, the imams are state officials, the mosques are under a control, ... What has happened here is that he uses this supposedly secularist system to control the imams so that they do not say anything outrageous. 

 

 

Q: How does the unstable situation in the Middle East affect Turkey and what is its position and involvement?

 

A: It depends on the conflict, but well, obviously the situation of instability in the Middle East affects Turkey a lot because they are neighboring countries. Well, for example, Turkey wants to talk to the Syrian government, but the Syrian government told them that until they withdraw all the troops inside Syria they are not going to talk. Turkey says it is not going to withdraw its troops because otherwise Syria is going to massacre the millions of refugees and displaced people. However, with the rest of the countries Turkey has moderated positions, has met with the authorities, for example, Israelis before the new invasion of Gaza, is recomposing relations with Israel, with Egypt, with the Emirates, with Saudi Arabia, ...  Basically Erdoğan wants to get along with all Middle Eastern countries as much as possible.

 

 

Q: After last year's earthquake management, it was believed that in the 2023 presidential election there was some chance that Erdoğan would lose. However, this was not the case. Why despite this situation and many others, such as the economic situation, is he still winning the elections? 

 

A: Because he has a broad control of the narrative and is very skillful, the opposition was not at all skillful in naming a candidate. All in all, Erdoğan came close to losing, which he won with 52% to 48% and in a runoff, which is the closest he has ever come to losing and now he has lost the local elections. The 2023 presidential elections were four months after the earthquake, people were still in a state of shock and, moreover, Erdoğan had promised that he was going to rebuild everything very quickly, in about a year. What happens? Well, Erdoğan's party always wins in the provinces that were affected by the earthquake, so those people were not going to vote for the opposition. Mostly, it's a thing of what I was saying at the beginning, he has a control of the narrative and the media. I did an article in which I think it is quite well stated in that, which was tanks against onions: the opposition talked about onions, talked about inflation, but the Government talked about the new tanks they had presented, the aircraft carriers or electric cars made in Turkey all the time. And of course, as 80% of the media are controlled by companies close to the Government, when it came to talking about the opposition, they talked about the problems they had, they did not talk about onions or inflation. 

 

 

Q: As we were mentioning before, the AKP party in the last local elections lost a lot of provinces and also failed to win neither the mayoralty of Istanbul nor Ankara. Do you think this may be a reflection of what may happen in the presidential elections of 2028?

 

A: It could be. But of course, it had also happened to him in 2019 that in the local elections he made a lot of progress for the opposition and then failed to transfer it to the national level. There are four years left for the 2028 elections, we do not know what can happen until then. We also don't even know if Erdoğan is going to run again, because in theory he could no longer by law, and we also don't know how the opposition is going to run. Politics moves very quickly here in Turkey. But well, what has happened in the local elections is a breakthrough, because you see that, because of the country's own demographic evolution, that the younger people and the people in the cities vote for the opposition and it's the more rural areas and the outside vote that support the AKP. And that then let's say it's a trend: new voters are voting more for the opposition because they haven't known anything else in their life than Erdoğan, and even young conservative people are voting for other parties. 

 

 

Q: What did Erdoğan's entry into government mean for journalism in Turkey?

 

A: Well, nothing bad at first. When I came to Turkey in the early 2000s, there was a healthy freedom of the press. It was curious, because there were many obstacles for the press, but they were more of state reflexes, for example, on issues like the Kurdish question or issues like investigating corruption within the state, the military, and so on. In the 2000s the Turkish press was very free, in fact, I would even say that there was much more quality in television news than in Spain: you had several news channels with very good people -many of whom are now in exile- and there were many debates. They started to talk about the Armenian genocide, they started to talk about the whole Kurdish question freely.... Now the format is still there, but the participants are of a very low quality: they basically say the same thing, they say nonsense, conspiracy theories, etc. I think Erdoğan's re-election in 2011 and the Gezi protests of 2013 were the turning point. That's when more regulatory bodies were put in place, because as they are gaining more and more, they are cracking down on the press: first with fines, then putting journalists in jail, and so on. 

 

 

Q: How has the political climate in Turkey affected journalism in the country?

 

A: Well, now the quality of the media is very bad. Turkey went from being a country where it was a pleasure to watch TV news, where there were 25 national newspapers from the extreme left to the extreme right, to having lousy TV programs, sensationalist online media, .... There is also an opposing press, what happens is that they have no money. One of the keys to this was the purchase of the Doğan group, which was a very large conglomerate that had a private news agency with correspondents in all the provinces. I remember that in the early 2010s, when I went to any province where I had not been, I would meet with these people or those from the agencies and they were very good journalists, local, who knew what was going on, you could ask them anything, etc. What happened? That this also came under the control of pro-erdoğan companies, so now the opposition press - which to a greater extent are people who are in Istanbul and Ankara - is dedicated to reacting to the news published by the government, that is, there is very little investigation of their own or intention to publish their own news. There are also a couple of channels closely linked to the opposition that now have more possibilities because they get institutional advertising through the municipalities they control and that has given them more money, but they don't have the money or the means to cover the whole country, so it is a more reactive journalism. 

 

 

Q: How do you think Turkish journalists balance the need to report objectively with the potential risks of reporting on controversial or sensitive topics?

 

A: Turkish journalists who are engaged in doing that are very brave, because they are most likely to be put in prison. It is also true that there are far fewer journalists in jail now, in the 2010s there were about 100 and now there are about 13. But well, even so, there are constant trials and it is exhausting, it is very tiring, especially if you have a family and an economic situation like the one in Turkey. On the other hand, the people who work for the government media, well, they are taking everything. For example, the TRT media, which has just launched its Spanish version, will have around 30 people connected to YouTube and they are earning six-figure salaries. However, journalists who are more critical because they consider it part of their job already take it for granted that this can land them in jail and accept it. 

 

 

Q: How do you think the international community views this situation of journalism in Turkey?

 

A: Well, there is not much talk about it lately. Only in the international press freedom institutions, which always put out their alerts: that if they are going to judge such and such a person, that Turkey is very bad in this case, and so on. But, well, this issue is not so much on the agenda because, besides, as there are many conflicts, it is more interesting to collaborate with Turkey than to be against it. 

 

 

Q: Have you faced any challenges as a foreign journalist in Turkey, knowing the situation here with journalism?

 

A: Yes, when I came here, foreign journalists did not have any problems. However, over the years and with the economic crisis, xenophobia has grown a lot. There have also been times when the government discourse was more against foreign media, especially after the 2018 coup d'état, when foreign journalists were insulted. That is why I say that the media network that Erdoğan has built is very important, because it comes to affect the work of the journalist: when he is constantly talking - he gives two or three speeches a day many times - that “the foreign press are spies” or that “they are envious of us,” well, that affects the idea that the population has of foreigners. On the other hand, when they start saying “we collaborate with our friends in the European Union” or “Spain is our great friend”, it affects us in a very positive way. As foreign journalists we had problems especially in 2016 and 2017, that there were Spanish colleagues who were expelled and who have been banned from entering, many of us had problems with the press card, and so on. Also, now that the relations between Turkey and Spain are very good at the economic or government level, we have advantages.  

 

 

Q: What measures do you take to ensure your safety and freedom while doing your work?

 

A: There is another issue here and that is that media repression is very arbitrary. I remember an article about a colleague of mine whose press card was not renewed and who had to leave, another one who was Finnish-Turkish, who was prosecuted and had to leave because otherwise they would put him in jail, but nothing happened to me and other colleagues who write about the same thing. What measures do I take to avoid problems? Well, I do my job honestly and that's all there is to it. It is also true that you know very well what the red lines can be, which would be, for example, the PKK - the Kurdish armed group that is considered a terrorist. To talk about these issues you have to try to have a more or less honest coverage in which, if they come after you, you can defend yourself. 

 

 

Q: Have you noticed any significant differences between working as a foreign journalist in Turkey versus, for example, Greece?

 

A: Yes, the first thing is that government sources in Greece talk, in Turkey it is very difficult. But well, in Greece also the situation in recent years has worsened a lot. In fact, I have had problems in Greece, I was arrested a couple of times, but nothing serious, although now, after the economic crisis, they have begun to have a control of the media that leads the way of Turkey in a way. In fact, I have colleagues I have worked with who are in Greece and they are eager to get out of there because the atmosphere is a bit breathable. 

 

 

Q: How do you get official sources to write your news or your articles as a foreigner? 

 

A: Mainly through contacts, but also through spokespersons, although the latter rarely tell you anything. When you tell them you are a journalist, they usually say “oh, we're not going to tell you anything, write us an e-mail” and then they never answer. But well, there are people you know who have a certain amount of confidence in you and they usually tell you things. 

 

 

Q: Do you think your identity as a foreign person gives you a certain advantage or disadvantage in terms of freedom of expression?

 

A: Yes, a certain advantage for sure. Moreover, being Spanish also, because let's say they care less about being criticized in Spanish than in English, because of the audience that will be reached. A very important difference between a Turkish journalist and a foreign one is that, if I am arrested now, the most they can do to me is to throw me out of the country and a Turkish journalist would be put in jail.