Blas Moreno

Question: Who were the Young Turks and what was their role on the road to the republic?

 

Answer: To contextualize, Turkey, before being an independent state, belonged to the Ottoman Empire. This empire, before World War I, was very decadent politically, geopolitically and socially, i.e. the system was no longer functioning. In particular, there was a lot of dissatisfaction with how the Sultan ran the politics and the regime. Before the outbreak of the First World War, a reformist movement began to emerge in Turkey, the Young Turks, who proposed to modernize the country in an industrial and political sense, but also with a nationalist axis. The Ottoman Empire, historically, had been a very tolerant empire with minorities, because it is true that most of the population is Turkish, but there are also other minority populations such as Armenians or Greeks, but a priori they get along quite well, with many nuances. However, when the young Turks arrived, they understood that in order to modernize the country and relaunch the empire, they had to focus their political program on Turkification, that is, the Turkish identity of that nation. So, they launch a campaign that is at the same time a campaign of political reform and national reaffirmation of the country. This group is the one that will end up carrying out the genocide against the Armenians. Although it is done under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire, it is these new politicians who decide that, in order for the country to move forward, all undesirable minorities must be “cleansed”, according to them, including the Armenians in particular. 

 

 

Q: How was the Republic of Turkey founded?

 

A: The Ottoman Empire was in the losing group of the First World War. After this defeat, they lost everything they had in the Middle East and the Balkans, i.e. Greece, Bulgaria or Syria, for example, and not only that, but the victors even occupied the whole of Anatolia. At that moment, the empire breaks down and a person emerges from among the military who a priori is simply an outstanding military man, but who has no more pedigree, that is Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He began to win battles against the Greeks, the British and the French who had occupied Anatolia because they wanted to divide it up, and he even managed to turn the war around. Finally, he managed to recover all of Anatolia and that is when he re-founded the country. 

 

 

Q: What changes did Atatürk make in the new Turkey?

 

A: Atatürk realized that it was necessary to change the system from the grassroots, since they were on the verge of disappearing as a country. He created a republican, secular system, abolished the central religious institution in the country, abolished the caliphate and oriented Turkey towards Europe, because he understood that this was the way to modernize the country. Other measures he took to become more like a European country were to change the alphabet from Arabic to Latin or to change the calendar from Rumi to Gregorian. With all these changes, Atatürk founded the Turkish Nationalist Republic. It is very important to emphasize that this was carried out in opposition to all the minorities that existed, including the Kurds, for example, and with a view much more oriented towards Europe than towards the East. This is also going to be the seed of the conflict later on, because then all that population, especially practicing Muslims in the interior of the country who are going to be subjugated by the modernized European minority - what they call the white Turks of Izmir or Istanbul - are going to remain silent for 80 years, but there is going to come a time when they are going to regain power, which is going to be when Erdoğan comes to power. So, the re-foundation of Turkey also puts the seed of the crisis that is seen after a century. 

 

 

Q: How did the countries around Turkey view this new state?

 

A: The countries in the Middle East did not have much of an autonomous political entity because they were occupied and colonized by Western countries, i.e. Syria, Lebanon, Jordan or Palestine were occupied by the UK or France and did not have much leverage. It is true that the fact that Turkey won the Turkish War of Independence made Turkey reassert itself as a regional power, at least as an independent country that has the capacity to impose its criteria on some things. The United Kingdom and France see Turkey as an actor that, at the very least, must be respected, because it is no longer the Ottoman Empire that they laughed at during the war. In the Balkan area they viewed Turkey with some fear, because Turkey has always been a big country in the south that threatens, for example, the independence of Greece, Bulgaria or Bosnia, because in the 19th century Turkey was an occupying power. In the Caucasus countries they were just at the time of the Armenian genocide, so the entire Armenian population, who had also had to flee to the Middle East, viewed Turkey with fear and felt hated. Then the relationship with the Soviet Union is also very interesting: at the beginning, as Atatürk was more pro-Western and was not a great friend of communism, they got along regularly, but later, when the Cold War came, Turkey always put itself on the Western side -on the side of the United States-, but maintaining a cordial relationship with the USSR because they were very close, on the other side of the sea, so they did not want to get along badly either.

 

 

Q: What did Atatürk's death mean? 

 

A: Atatürk died in 1938 and it was a brutal political shock. Once he died, the political landscape in Turkey changed because, although Atatürk was very popular, he was still a dictator. His successor, İnönü, also maintains to a large extent the trappings of a dictatorial regime for a few years, but he has no choice but to open up the regime a little, because he has neither the charisma nor the power that Atatürk had. Elections begin to be held, the first ones were in 1950 and Menderes won, who did not belong to CHP -Atatürk's party- and, in this way, the political system begins to open up to other voices and important political actors who did not have a political voice during Atatürk's time. Although these changes are beginning to be seen, the Army has remained as the guarantor of what is Kemalism -Atatürk's movement-, that is, that idea that the country had to be republican, secular and nationalist. So, all those new policies that want to question that are going to find a very clear iron wall, which is the army. When Menderes had been in government for a few years, a coup d'état took place, the military arrested him and executed him. In conclusion, even if politics opened up a little, even if there were elections, changes at the political level or rotation of parties in power, there was always going to be an actor, which was the Army. The army, throughout the 20th century, carried out coups d'état again and again to prevent politics from going too far away from what Atatürk proposed. The only one who managed to stop this trend when he came to power was Erdoğan, because his movement was very strong and, besides, we are already in the 2000s and a coup d'état is already a bit outdated. On the other hand, another thing that I find interesting is Atatürk's personality cult, which he already cultivated during his lifetime. However, when he dies, it becomes even greater, because he is the father of the fatherland, the founder, the one who saved the country from the war, from the occupation of the Westerners. Now if you go to Turkey you will see Atatürk's face everywhere, on banknotes, on coins, in every bar, in every hairdresser's, in every place. However, people who are not Kemalist are more and more questioning that image, it is still very taboo to do so, but it is less and less, so, for example, Erdoğan questions things about Atatürk. 

 

 

Q: What did Turkey's entry into NATO mean for Turkey?

 

A: Turkey joined NATO in 1952, that is, right away, because NATO was created in 1949, and it did it as a way of guaranteeing its security in the face of the great threat of the Soviet Union, which is a very close country. Keep in mind that at that time Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were also in the USSR, so Turkey had a direct border with the Soviet Union. The threat of the expansion of communism and the purely Soviet military threat was also very great from the Black Sea and from the Caucasus. So, Turkey understands that, if it has to join any bloc, it is more interested in joining the Western bloc, which is more aligned with its anti-communist and pro-Western values and which also serves as an umbrella of protection against the Soviet threat. 

 

 

Q: How would you describe Turkey's foreign policy under Erdoğan's leadership?

 

A: Initially, when he comes to power, Erdoğan is a person who is committed to avoiding conflict and getting along with everyone. However, as time goes on, he adopts a much more proactive policy at the international level, which has even been called neo-Ottomanist in the sense of wanting to regain the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and in the Middle East. For example, he gets involved in the Syrian war, he recovers the war against the Kurds in Iraq, in Syria and also in southern Turkey, over time he adopts a much more critical position, for example, with Israel on the Palestinian issue. Erdoğan adopts this more proactive stance with Israel, with Russia, with Iran, threatening Greece, influencing more in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia - which is the country with the largest Muslim population, ... In short, more proactive with the countries around him and always looking for conflict with the West. That last one is very interesting, because even though it is a NATO country and a country that wanted to join the European Union, Erdoğan in the last 10-15 years has taken as his foreign policy flag to fight with the West over things: with the United States over issues of buying and selling arms, with the European Union over what he considers to be Islamophobic policies of European countries, ... All this responds to an idea which is that Turkish foreign policy obeys Erdoğan's interests at the internal level: if Erdoğan is interested for internal issues to suddenly stir up the ghost of war against the Kurds, he is going to do it, because that is going to be good for him to get more votes from people who do not want the Kurds in Turkey; if Erdoğan understands that he is interested in stirring up the idea that in Europe they are Islamophobic and attack them, well, he is going to do it because that is going to be good for him to get votes. It must be understood above all that it is a much more active policy, much more assertive and that it generally pursues that ultimate goal which is to benefit Erdoğan domestically. 

 

 

Q: How would you describe Erdoğan's government for the changes he has made in Turkey?

 

A: I would say very personalistic. Erdoğan is a very charismatic person, within Turkey he is very much loved by part of the population and by AKP - his political party - which he founded. In fact, he founded the party in rebellion, that is, he split from the party he had previously had, he founded this party and he immediately managed to dominate it, not because he expelled the other leaders of the AKP, but because he is so charismatic that he has managed to keep all the power of the party and the others have ended up leaving in opposition to his policies, but he has achieved, let's say, by his merits that power. The other ministers have been changing many times: there have been some who have stood out from time to time, for example, Ahmet Davutoğlu who was Foreign Minister and Prime Minister for many years, he was the one who proposed that policy of containment, of getting along with everyone, but there came a time when Erdoğan expelled him and that was it. It is rare that there are ministers who stand out a lot in Erdoğan's cabinet, because they are usually people who are always in his shadow. On the other hand, everything obeys Erdoğan's political interests, for example, inflation has been skyrocketing for 3 or 4 years now. The logical thing to do would be to raise interest rates to fight inflation, but as this would probably hurt the lower classes, which are the people Erdoğan votes for, he goes against all economic political theory, decides not to raise interest rates to benefit his voters and so inflation continues to rise. Since Erdoğan somehow indirectly controls the Turkish Central Bank, he gets that. So, I would describe the government as a very Erdoğan-centric government, in whatever he wants and serving his interests. 

 

 

Q: Why do you think he censors the media in this way?

 

A: Well, for two reasons. First, very simply, any regime that wants to stay in power in an undemocratic way, let's put it subtly like that, is going to go with the media, because it is one of the main bulwarks of democracy in that sense. So, if there is no critical media and there is no one to tell the bad things about the regime, it is much easier for the government to sell its goodness and hide its miseries, so to speak. On the other hand, there is the key to the division in Turkey between the white, pro-Western, pro-European, secular Turks, and the Anatolian Turks, conservative Muslim practitioners, who are wary of the West, wary of secularism. So what happens? That the media are generally all from Istanbul and all or most of them are led and written in by people whom we would call the “liberals”, the left-wing people, the pro-European people, the people who have traveled, who have languages, who are not practicing. So the erdoğanists distrust and distrust the media, they don't trust them, because they are the enemy within the country. Why in the United States do the Trumpists distrust the New York Times? Because they see it as a leftist media that does not share their values. So, beyond it being simply a tactic to suppress critical voices in a country that is heading towards a dictatorship, it is also a reflection of the culture wars and the political divide in the country between the erdoğanists and the other side of the country, which is the, let's say, more liberal side. 

 

 

Q: So you think Erdoğan is on his way to becoming a dictator? 

 

A: I think Erdoğan wants to be in control and he is going to do his best to keep it. He is not a dictator by any means, there are still competitive elections in Turkey. In fact, very recently there were municipal elections and the AKP lost them overwhelmingly, which is a surprise. It is true that it is taking steps to reduce the balance of power, you see it in the Central Bank, you see it in the judiciary, you see it in the media. There have also been many suspicions of electoral manipulation in some moments of his mandate, for example, if a referendum or elections went wrong, he managed to repeat them. So, I am not sure that Erdoğan wants to be a Putin-style dictator, in the sense that Russia is a much more authoritarian country than Turkey without any doubt, because the elections there are a pantomime and it is not clear to me that he wants to go that far, because that requires also a much higher level of violence and also of international public exposure, of people criticizing you much more. But I do believe that he wants to stay in control, especially because he honestly believes that he is chosen by God, that he has a mission to save and to bring Turkey to a place where he believes it will be better off and he believes that he is the right person to do it. So, when you have a faith in your mission, anything that goes against that is a problem for you and you're going to try to get it out of the way. I mean, I do think he thinks very highly of himself and very poorly of others, obviously. 

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Q: After the government's handling of the earthquake, it was believed that in the May 2023 presidential elections there was a good chance of an Erdoğan defeat. Why despite the people's dissatisfaction with this management and with regard to other areas such as the economy, is he still winning the elections?

 

A: There was a lot of debate as to whether or not he was going to lose the elections in the wake of the earthquake. In fact, there was a lot of comparison with the elections that took place in 1990, when there was also a very serious earthquake and the Government lost the elections for that reason. Evidently the Government is largely responsible for the deaths of the earthquake: first, for allowing the massive construction of buildings that do not comply with any regulations and then also for not having inspected those buildings afterwards. But, the media has a very important role here: if you do not inform the country about what is happening, then it is a problem, because you manage to overshadow or censor critical opinions about this issue. You also have to insist a lot on this because people outside Turkey don't fall for this, and it's that Erdoğan is very popular. I mean, when Erdoğan does badly in an election he gets 40% of the votes. On the other hand, the candidate that the CHP -the opposition- also had is a candidate that I think made a pretty good campaign to humanize himself, to present himself as someone close, but he is a candidate that is already hackneyed, he is a very old man and he is not so popular. So, it is not a surprise that he did not win the elections, frankly, it was quite probable that he would not win. So, I think that the opposition failed to find a candidate who could gather the support of all the Muslim population that sees in Erdoğan and in the AKP the symbol of their progress, of economic development, infrastructure: Erdoğan has taken the country in his 20 years from being a very poor and agrarian country, to a very powerful industry and infrastructure and also at an international level much more respectable, and people value all this. 

 

 

Q: Do you think that, if bad situations had not been sought for the mayor of Istanbul, because in the end he could not run in the general elections because of that, he would have managed to take power away from Erdoğan?

 

A: Maybe yes, he is a super good project and I believe that sooner or later this duel is going to happen, because he is actually the big opposition candidate right now. However, they also have a tactical problem: and that is that, if Imamoğlu ran for the presidency, he would lose the mayoralty of Istanbul, so, it was risking everything for everything: if you leave Istanbul to run for the presidency and you lose, you lose the presidency and also the mayoralty of Istanbul, which is very important, we are talking about 1/4 of the population of the country being in that city. So, partly because of that and partly because the opposition was running united, it was a very complex and very heterodox coalition of a lot of different actors and they had a hard time finding a candidate. I think Imamoğlu also decided that it wasn't the time, that he didn't have to push the machine so much and that it was better to wait a little bit longer. If he runs in a few years, maybe he can be the person to win, but I also tell you that politics is playing five years from now... who knows. 

 

 

Q: As we mentioned before, in the last local elections, the AKP party has lost in several provinces and has not won the mayoralties of Ankara or Istanbul. After this setback, do you think Erdoğan could lose in the 2028 elections?

 

A: Without any doubt. I think this is the first major wake-up call Erdoğan has received in his life. This is the first time he has lost. In fact, he has realized that he has lost because he has acknowledged defeat and that is very rare. I think this is in response to the fact that the economy is going very bad and it is getting worse and worse. So, no matter how much of a fan of Erdoğan you are, you can't not think that this gentleman has been ruling for 20 years now and if there is a responsible for that, it can't be the West, the CIA, NATO or the Armenians. It is that in the end the government is partly to blame, it is that there is no choice but to recognize it. These elections have also shown that there is an appetite for change in Turkey, that people are not always going to vote for the AKP no matter what the AKP does, that they are not guaranteed power. Now, between now and 2028 a lot of things will happen and maybe the opposition is able to get to the elections in four years time without having yet agreed on a powerful candidate, with a powerful campaign. Also Erdoğan still has a lot of pull and he is not that old yet, and he has four years to change things and make it more difficult for the opposition to win at the level of election regulation, chasing the media, etc. 

 

 

Q: Finally, could the creation of the new party called Yeniden Refah Partisi (YRP) be the first real competition for Erdoğan?

 

A: Yes. There is a growing Islamism in Turkey and the creation of this party is the first time that Erdoğan has a significant rival on his right. He was always guaranteed control of the Islamist-conservatist axis and now it seems that a new player has emerged, which is a major problem for him and reflects the fact that there are practicing Muslims who are weaned from the AKP. The party has already won in Yozgat and Şanlıurfa provinces, traditionally AKP voters, which shows that the YRP is gaining strength.