Eduardo Saldaña

«The media in Turkey play a counter-power role, and in a country where the leader wants to control all the power, any kind of similar force has to be pursued and eliminated»

Interview conducted on 03/05/2024

Question: What were the main political and social factors that led to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey?

Answer: I would say the main one was the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. I mean, the Ottoman Empire was already in a decline and the First World War was a very hard blow. At that time, you start to divide the empire among the winning powers, but there was an anti-interventionist sentiment of young Turkish nationalists who were already there, the so-called Young Turks. That was when Atatürk carried out a civil war or led a movement to expel the Western powers from Turkey and establish a Turkish Republic. But before that, it is true that movements like the Young Turks already existed when the Ottoman Empire was in decline because there were already those who began to call for the creation of a Turkish state of their own, because that was the fruit of all those nationalist currents that you already had in Western Europe and from which many of them drank, because many Turks at that time, among them Atatürk, especially military men who went to train in these countries, such as France, Germany, some for the United Kingdom. This nationalist feeling they took it back to Turkey and they identified themselves with Turkish, not with a Syrian or a Lebanese who were part of the Ottoman Empire. In conclusion, I would say that the main factor was that combination of an economic decline with a rise of nationalist movements all over the continent, a defeat in World War I and an interventionism of the Western powers that generated a reaction from those nationalist forces. 

Q: How has Turkey's position on the international scene evolved from its founding until now? 

A: You have to understand that Turkey has always been a pro-Western country, but very nationalistic, and also that Turkey has historically been a member of NATO and an ally of the United States, although it has always gone its own way and has always had clashes with the Western powers. So, it is true that at the beginning Turkey folded inwards and had a very internal look, because it had to establish the whole model of the Turkish Republic. Later, in the Second World War, Turkey did not play a very important role precisely because it preferred not to get into trouble because it had enough problems of its own. In the Cold War it was clearly aligned with the West, because it must be understood that Turkey was a secular country, so the internal struggle was more against the communist forces, it was not a struggle between secularism and Islam, it was much more marked by the leftist currents that penetrated, above all, in the Kurdish regions, the Turkish left was also very much mobilized. So, let's say that Turkey was aligned with the West, but it did not have a role or an external projection as we can see today, since the major projection was framed within the struggle with Greece in the context of Enosis - the union of Cyprus and Greece. With the arrival of Erdoğan there does begin to be a revisionism of Turkish foreign policy and also a reconception of its role in the international order, that is, the United States has won, the Soviet Union has collapsed, an ally opens up in the north called Russia and Turkey begins to project itself. It is one of the countries that best understands the idea of intermediate powers in the international order and begins to redefine that projection it had, looking towards the Ottoman Empire and looking towards its Turkish roots, that is to say, it combines Islam with nationalism, the more traditional Turkey that comes from all the ethnic groups of Central Asia -which allows it to project itself towards the countries of Turkic tradition: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, etc. - and then the Islamic projection, which is a projection much more encompassed within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, which looks towards the whole of the Middle East and begins to understand itself as a power that needs to have a projection to the extent that others are emerging, such as Iran -with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 it had already grown much more in the Middle East-, Israel -it had the support of the United States- or Saudi Arabia -which was also growing-. Even so, Turkey never manages to release the ally of NATO and the Westerners, because the Turks continue to look to the European and Western model as an example within their own conception of Islam in Turkey and of the form of country they want, but they know that they are going to be closer to the United States than to Saudi Arabia on a social level. But well, the key of the Turkish foreign policy now I would say that it is that, it is an intermediate power that is conceived as a great power in the Middle East. 

Q: What legacy has the Foundation of the Republic left on a political, social or cultural level in Turkey? 

A: The legacy continues, that is, Atatürk marked Turkey and will always mark it, because Atatürk already transcended his person and is an idea: the idea of the strong man who guides Turkey, and that is why I think he marked Turkey in many things. Atatürk marked Turkey, first, in the resistance to Western interference, because the creation of Turkey, as I told you before, arises from a reaction and a need to expel someone who was trying to control its territory and that is something that is still very present. So, there has always been in all Turkish governments a rejection or a suspicion of the conspiracies that come from outside to try to control them, and that is very marked. Then, the role of the military, which was very present before, but they still have a very great popular respect for them. Also secularism, which is a much more complicated issue now, because secularism is what is generating more tension, because it is what causes more problems to Erdoğan and to those Islamist currents that are trying to cut politics in Turkey. It is true that in the beginning Erdoğan and the Muslim brothers in Turkey, the Turkish Islamists, tried to maintain that secularism because they knew how important it was, but they could not and can never stop the more conservative and Islamist drive within the AKP or the more Islamist parties, which leads to a social confrontation and the political frameworks that you had. 

Q: How would you describe Atatürk's political and social vision for Turkey during his rule? 

A: On the political level I would say three: a secular, authoritarian vision - understood in the context of 1930, Atatürk understood government as the need for a strong man who will lead the mass toward triumph and freedom - and nationalist. As for the social aspect, I could not tell you exactly, but I am sure that he sought a westernization of society and conceived Turkey as a heterogeneous country, that is, he understood that there were different visions, but all within the framework of secularism and Turkishness, which is why he expelled Armenians or Greeks from Turkish territory. So he did have a very nationalist vision in the social sphere, very homogenizing, very Turkic, and you can see it with the Kurds, that repression of the Kurdish people is the result of the fact that at a social level it was an exacerbated Turkish nationalism. 

Q: How did Atatürk manage with his ideals the different realities that existed in Turkey, such as the Kurds or the Muslims? 

A: With repression. The Armenian genocide was previous, but then there was the expulsion of Greeks, Greek Cypriots and Armenians from Turkish territory, a control of the Kurds. I believe that this happened also because at the time Atatürk came to power a complete reconversion of the country was taking place and that is what led to tensions and struggles with forces that resisted it. An example of this is the Kurds claiming the creation of Kurdistan or the Armenians claiming part of the Turkish territory as part of Armenia, which Atatürk controlled with internal repression. 

Q: What changes took place in Turkey after Atatürk's death? 

A: I wouldn't say that there were big changes since he was no longer there. But it is true that with the number of coups d'état that took place, in the end, Turkey was controlled for many, many years by military leaders. So, actually, everything remained quite stable in terms of the dynamics that marked post-Atatürk Turkey was a turnism that was based on the military controlling the power, trying to open up the politics a little bit and relax the military control, and the more Islamist forces started to emerge within Turkey, so quickly there was another coup d'état. So, I would say that, as such, Turkey at the level of ideological, social and national conception did not change much because the military were the guarantors of the inheritance of Atatürk's vision and at the minimum that there was an attempt to change Turkey, there was a coup d'état. This happened until the 1980s, when Özal came to government, who looked more to the economy and used economic growth and the look to Europe as a way to change that military influence, so that is when there began to be a greater social opening of Turkey and an erosion of Atatürk's ideas. 

Q: What did Turkey's entry into NATO mean for it?

A: It brought it closer to the West, it served to boost the Turkish military industry, for the Turkish military it was a modernization of the army and of all Turkey's military strategies, a security for Turkey, because it was already protected and protected by the United States, a strategic alliance that served to position it as a key country at the time and within the Alliance, since it is the only country that has that leg in Asia. 

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Q: How did Turkey start to be perceived internationally, both in Europe and then regionally in the Middle East after Atatürk died and you started to see a political change in the country? 

A: I wouldn't say there was a big change, because Atatürk died in 1938, that is, during the Second World War and the world was watching something else. When the Second World War ended, that is when the military juntas took turns. So there is no conception of Turkey changing because Turkey was governed by the military. It is very interesting if you see how Atatürk was talked about in the media from Spain: he was framed as another strong revolutionary leader who was bringing progress to a country in decline, as was done with Mussolini or Hitler at the time, that is, as men who were bringing a new model to their country. So when he died in 1938, everyone was looking more to Germany taking Poland, Spain was in the middle of the civil war, there were tensions in Europe, ... So I would say there was no perception of a change in Turkey, because to the world it was still the same country that Atatürk created, but ruled by the military. 

Q: How would you describe Erdoğan's government? 

A: In several phases. A first phase very much marked by a look at Europe in which it was believed that there could be a democratic Islamism, a second phase after the Gezi Park protests (2013) against the measures Erdoğan was carrying out to satisfy the Islamists and which clash with the idea of secularism, in which we start to see an authoritarian turn or an Islamist turn by Erdoğan and a beginning of the erosion of state structures, and a third one after the coup attempt in 2016, when he sees that he has to entrench his position and his legacy within the country. 

Q: Do you think that with Erdoğan in government there could be an attempt to change the secularism of the Turkish Constitution?

A: Not now, but a few years ago I would have answered that maybe. After the results of these last elections, I think he is not going to do it, because now his figure is very damaged and the economic situation is not good, then to get into something like that without solving the economic situation of the country and without more weight and popular support, at the political level, would be a suicide. Because it would be touching the fundamental pillars at a time when Erdoğan and his people don't have so much support, plus there you would have the resistance of the nationalists, of the gray wolves, for example, the CHP would put up resistance as well, ...

Q: How did relations between Turkey and the European Union evolve?

A: I think the relations between Turkey and the EU have been evolving along with the stages of Erdoğan's government that I was telling you before. In the beginning there is a very good relationship and it seems that that accession process is moving forward. At the beginning there was a very fast process in which it seemed that Turkey was going to join the European Union, but then there was a halt due to the 2008 crisis and Europe did not start to look favorably on that integration for several reasons: first, because of the impact that Turkey's entry into the internal market could have on the migratory or economic level, because it is a powerful country and it would mean many imbalances, and in fact there are countries like Germany or France that are beginning to prevent that accession. On the other hand, Erdoğan's authoritarian turn does not end up meeting the requirements demanded from Europe, so he starts to use this European refusal politically to gain popular support. That's when the negotiations start to get very tangled and the process gets bogged down. Right now in Turkey there is a lot of disaffection with the process, with the fact that it could not be carried out, because the Turks did have this Europeanist aspiration, but now there is this disaffection with Europe and a feeling of abandonment. I would say that right now relations, as long as Erdoğan is in power, are going to be at a standstill. 

Q: Why is Erdoğan persecuting the Kurds in this way? 

A: Well, Erdoğan is not persecuting all Kurds. There are many Kurds who are Islamists, so Erdoğan has a very good relationship with these Islamist Kurds. He persecutes the PKK because it has traditionally been secular and left-wing, as well as being an enemy of the Islamist Kurds and an independence group. In short, Erdoğan persecutes Kurds who pose an internal threat to his power. 

Q: Do you consider that Erdoğan is on his way to becoming a dictator? 

A: Well, I think he was before, but not now. I think he was closer in 2019 because things were much more complicated. Erdoğan is not a dictator, but he is certainly an authoritarian man, he has all the ballots to be able to be a dictator, but that he can achieve it is what I don't believe right now. He lacks years and even, the most Erdoğanist Turks, the young people who voted for the AKP are a little bit tired of his figure, they have not known another leadership and they are looking for another leader. I do believe that Turkey can be an electoral authoritarian regime, that is, a regime in which people vote, but elections serve absolutely no purpose. 

Q: Why do you think he censors the media in this way? 

A: So that his image is not damaged and that what they may say does not affect him politically. In the end the opposition media are among the last forces capable of bringing out Erdoğan's contradictions and mismanagement. He has always sold himself as a great manager as a leader who unites the country, and the more progressive media have pointed out the opposite, as have the NGOs or as have the social networks. Any space of criticism of his management is a threat and he is going to put an end to it. The media in Turkey plays a counter-power role, and in a country where the leader wants to control all the power, any kind of similar force has to be pursued and eliminated. 

Q: What changes at the national and international level do you think Erdoğan needs to make in order to get the overall situation in the country improved? 

A: First control the economy and then maybe not run in the next elections, things he could have done earlier. What can he also do to make Turkey a democratic country? Well, stop eroding the division of powers, stop giving power to conservative and Islamist currents in the country. I don't think he will do that at this stage, because if he does that he may lose the support of those forces who will give it to parties that are more Islamist and conservative than he is. So, maybe what Turkey could use is to turn the page and have a new leader, whether it is from the AKP or another party, but a change.

Q: Going back to 2023, after the handling of the earthquake in terms of the buildings or the aid arriving late to the affected areas, it was believed that there was quite a good chance that Erdoğan would lose the May 2023 presidential election. Why despite this situation and many others, such as the economic situation, is he still winning the elections? 

A: I think it goes beyond the economic situation or the management of the earthquake. What alternative was there to Erdoğan for the more conservative parts of the country? It is that maybe the people whose houses collapsed did not vote for him, also that to this day the transparency of the vote count in those areas is still being questioned and then, it is a more ideological and nationalistic question, the feeling of belonging. Erdoğan represents what Turkey in a time of crisis may need. On the other hand, the opposition also did not know how to put together an alternative capable of rivaling Erdoğan and did not know - and still does not know - how to reach out to the Anatolian population. So, Erdoğan wins because there is no other option that can come to have the appeal and the ability to influence. 

Q: In the elections that took place on March 31, it was seen that the AKP did not get the results it was looking for, it lost very many provinces and did not get the mayorships of Istanbul and Ankara. The possibility is being raised that, if Erdoğan runs in 2028 for the presidential elections, that he might lose and also, on the other hand, that the mayor of Istanbul will run for the CHP. How do you see this situation in general? 

A: I don't think Erdoğan will run, but it is going to depend a lot on the evolution of the economy in Turkey. And it is also true that it was very important the 2023 elections precisely for this, because they gave him an oxygen balloon to have five more years to organize the country and either build a suitable successor, or find a dauphin that will allow him to remain in power, but in the shadows. On the other hand, I believe that Imamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul is almost certain to run for president, because he is the only figure who has pull within Turkey and has been in control of the country's city for two consecutive legislatures. In short, the key is to see how Turkish politics evolves these next few years in terms of the erosion of these kinds of obstacles that Erdoğan may have to win again in 2028.